Security and process safety

Software that can move a setpoint in an ammonia plant needs more than a good model.

Nitreum is designed around three facts: ammonia is safety-critical, recipes and process settings are intellectual property, and the plant's existing automation and safety systems must keep running if Nitreum stops. This page is the design posture; certifications are on the roadmap and not claimed.

Safety systems read, never writtenTenant isolation by designSOC 2 on the roadmap

run_scn_01 · agent graph · scenario 10 nodes · 1 approval gate
01 · orchestrator order.receive ✓ SUCCEEDED 02 · orchestrator twin.simulate ✓ SUCCEEDED 03 · reform_synth loop.control ✓ SUCCEEDED 04 · react_evap evaporate.control ✓ SUCCEEDED 05 · granulate granulate.control ✓ SUCCEEDED 06 · coat_condition condition.cool ✓ SUCCEEDED 07 · defect_inspect inspect.granules ✓ SUCCEEDED 08 · orchestrator approve.human ◆ APPROVAL 09 · blend_bag blend.bag ✓ SUCCEEDED 10 · quality_conf release.genealogy ✓ SUCCEEDED

Illustrative scenario: Complex run · one urea granulation campaign from synthesis gas to bagged lot · ammonia loop, urea synthesis and evaporation, granulator, dryer and cooler, NPK bagging line. Not a measured run.

Defense in depth

Six layers between a model and a setpoint

01

Allow-list

An agent can only write to tags declared for it, through approved DCS or APC interfaces.

02

Limits

Per-tag rate and magnitude limits, declared and versioned, inside documented recipe, quality, safety, emissions, equipment and rollback bounds.

03

Stage

Shadow, assist or bounded, set per loop; nothing writes in shadow; every ammonia-loop stage is safety-gated.

04

Policy engine

Safety envelope, interlock state, grade, shift and operator presence evaluated before every write; moves that violate a process-safety or emissions control are blocked.

05

Human gate

Anything above the threshold, every safety-adjacent move and every release waits for a named person; ammonia-loop moves beyond the envelope wait for a process engineer and a process-safety approver.

06

Fallback

If Nitreum stops, the plant runs on its existing DCS, APC and safety systems.

Tool calls

Every call, on the record

Every tool invocation, argument and result is written to an immutable, human-readable log, and every reasoning step is expandable. Nothing about a run is hidden from the plant. The log below is the scenario run, not a measured one.

tool-call stream · run_scn_01
  1. 05:10:02mes.read_order({ campaign: "U-4471", grade: "UREA-46", pack: "BAG-50" })
  2. 05:10:02ok grade spec locked · permit limits v4 · SIS envelope read-only
  3. 05:10:03historian.read_baseline({ unit: "AMM-1", window: "30d" })
  4. 05:10:03ok energy per tonne baseline loaded · catalyst age noted
  5. 05:10:04twin.simulate({ candidates: 24, horizon: "campaign" })
  6. 05:10:45ok best plan #9 · permit margin held · lowest energy per tonne
  7. 05:10:46policy.evaluate({ plan: 9, stage: "bounded" })
  8. 05:10:46ok 7 writes permitted · 1 write requires human approval
  9. 05:10:47dcs.write_setpoint({ tag: "AMM1.LOOP_T", basis: "conversion+energy" })
  10. 05:14:30ok conversion on target · energy per tonne trending down
  11. 05:20:00analyzer.read_concentration({ unit: "EVAP-2" })
  12. 05:20:00ok melt concentration inside window · evaporator setpoint held
  13. 05:31:12granvis.read_distribution({ unit: "GRAN-1", metric: "size_moisture" })
  14. 05:31:12ok distribution inside spec band · recycle ratio trimmed after twin check
  15. 05:31:13vision.stream({ cameras: 12, models: ["size_shape", "dust", "caking", "bag_defect"] })
  16. 06:02:48dust spike · cooler belt · attributed to spray nozzle 3
  17. 06:02:49defect.attribute({ event: "dust_spike", cause: "granulator.nozzle_3" })
  18. 06:02:49ok granulate notified · spray trimmed inside window · second spike, then clean
  19. 06:02:50dcs.write_setpoint({ tag: "COAT1.RATE", basis: "moisture+caking_risk" })
  20. 06:02:50ok coating rate set · moisture inside storage window
  21. 06:02:52approval.request({ action: "loop.purge", reason: "beyond bounded envelope" })
  22. 06:05:06ok approved by the shift process engineer and the process-safety approver · smaller step · SIS untouched
  23. 07:40:10plc.write_setpoint({ tag: "BLEND1.RATIO", basis: "nutrient+segregation" })
  24. 07:40:10ok nutrient ratio on spec · bag weight on target · gate 2 trimmed
  25. 09:18:30mes.release_lot({ campaign: "U-4471", genealogy: "full" })
  26. 09:19:40ok lot released · scenario complete

Reasoning trace

Goal, plan, thought, action, observation, exactly as the orchestrator would record it.

GoalRun campaign U-4471 from synthesis gas to bagged lot: ammonia …

Run campaign U-4471 from synthesis gas to bagged lot: ammonia loop at target conversion per unit of energy, melt at exact concentration, granules on spec with minimum dust and recycle, conditioned for storage, bagged to weight and released with full genealogy and emissions readings.

PlanSimulate the whole campaign on the twin first. Lead with conve…

Simulate the whole campaign on the twin first. Lead with conversion so evaporation gets the right melt and the granulator gets the right concentration. Verify emissions and the safety envelope continuously. Let the granulator chase the size band only inside the approved window; hold any ammonia-loop move beyond the envelope for a human.

ThoughtThe standing practice runs the loop and the granulator on fixe…

The standing practice runs the loop and the granulator on fixed setpoints and corrects after the assay. With live conversion, concentration and granule distribution the loop and the granulator can sit at target. The saving is energy, recycle and dust, not safety margin: the safety-instrumented envelope and the permit limits are never candidates for optimization.

Actiontwin.simulate(candidates=24) → plan #9: conversion on target, …

twin.simulate(candidates=24) → plan #9: conversion on target, melt concentration on spec, granule distribution inside the band, permit margin unchanged, lowest predicted energy per tonne.

ObservationPlan #9 wants a purge-rate change on the ammonia loop beyond t…

Plan #9 wants a purge-rate change on the ammonia loop beyond the bounded envelope. The policy engine routes that single move to the shift process engineer and the process-safety approver and permits the other seven writes.

ActionExecute plan #9 at the bounded stage: loop temperature, evapor…

Execute plan #9 at the bounded stage: loop temperature, evaporator, granulator, coating and blend writes proceed; emissions are verified continuously; the purge move waits.

ObservationApproval granted at 06:05:06 with a smaller step and the safet…

Approval granted at 06:05:06 with a smaller step and the safety-instrumented envelope untouched. Two dust spikes were attributed to spray nozzle 3 and corrected by Granulate-and-Prill inside the approved window.

OutcomeScenario complete. The lot is released with conversion and ene…

Scenario complete. The lot is released with conversion and energy per tonne, melt concentration, granule distribution, nutrient assay, emissions readings and the human decision in the genealogy. No measured plant result is claimed; this is the run the platform is designed to execute.

Guardrails

An agent that can move a setpoint needs a leash

Nitreum writes to production equipment in a plant that handles ammonia. Every capability is scoped, every write is policy-checked, every output is cited, and every action is written to an append-only audit log the plant owns.

  • Bounded action space. Each agent can only write to an explicit tag allow-list, through approved DCS or APC interfaces, inside per-tag rate and magnitude limits, at the autonomy stage the plant has set.
  • Safety systems are read, never written. Safety-instrumented systems, interlocks, trip settings and emissions permit limits stay with the plant's process-safety program and the people who own it.
  • Policy engine before every write. Autonomy stage, safety envelope, interlock state, grade, shift and operator presence are evaluated before a setpoint moves. Any ammonia-loop move beyond the envelope waits for a named approver.
  • Grounded and cited. Every recommendation carries a citation to the spec, procedure or permit it relied on. Retrieval is tenant-isolated and permission-aware.
  • Immutable audit log. Append-only, exportable and retained on the plant's own storage, aligned to the plant's quality, emissions and process-safety record-keeping.
  • Hard fallback. If the edge node, the network or a model stops, the plant keeps running on its existing DCS, APC and safety systems.
  • Tenant and IP isolation. Recipes, process settings and plant IP never cross a customer boundary. On-prem and plant-edge deployment available.

Assurance posture

Assurance and certification status
ItemScopeStatus
SOC 2 Type I readinessCloud control plane QUEUED Roadmap, first 6 months
SOC 2 Type IICloud control plane QUEUED Roadmap, 6 to 12 months
Process-safety and emissions proceduresGrounding and record-keeping RUNNING Design basis for retrieval and the audit log
Per-tenant isolationData, memory, models RUNNING Design rule
On-prem and plant-edge deploymentIP- and safety-sensitive sites RUNNING Design option

Nitreum supports your process-safety, quality and emissions records. It is not a certification and it does not replace your safety program or management of change.

Read the security overview

Autonomy

Four stages, set per loop

A plant does not go from manual to bounded control in one step. Nitreum makes the stage explicit per loop, auditable and reversible at any time, and some decisions never leave the person. On the ammonia side every stage is safety-gated.

Autonomy stages and the human role at each
StageWhat the agent doesWhat the person doesWhen
ShadowPredicts conversion, concentration, granule quality, nutrient content, energy, emissions and off-spec risk; writes nothingRuns the plant as today; compares predictions to assay, historian and engineer outcomesFirst phase with every design partner
AssistRecommends bounded loop, evaporation, granulation, coating and blend moves with the evidenceA process engineer approves or rejects each oneAfter accuracy is proven against the baseline
BoundedWrites low-risk granulation, conditioning and blending setpoints inside documented recipe, quality, safety, emissions, equipment and rollback limitsApproves anything above the limits and every ammonia-loop move beyond the envelope; reviews the shift recordAfter the safety and ROI gates agreed up front
ExceptionsEscalates anything outside its envelope, safety-adjacent moves and release decisionsAlways decides these; the agent never doesPermanent
Assurance

Certification status

Stated plainly. Items on the roadmap are roadmap items.

Assurance items and status
ItemScopeStatus
SOC 2 Type I readinessCloud control plane QUEUED Roadmap, first 6 months
SOC 2 Type IICloud control plane QUEUED Roadmap, 6 to 12 months
Emissions and safety assurance packagesDesign partners QUEUED Roadmap, 6 to 12 months
Process-safety and emissions procedures, standardsGrounding and records RUNNING Design basis; not a certification of Nitreum
IP-safe and plant-edge deploymentRecipes, process settings, safety records RUNNING Design rule; on-prem option
OT safety

Failing safe is a design requirement

  • Supervisory, not primary. Nitreum sits above existing DCS and APC control; it never replaces an interlock or a safety-instrumented system.
  • Safety systems and permits are read-only. Trip settings, interlocks and emissions permit limits are verified and logged, never written.
  • Management of change stays with the plant. A new envelope, a new model version or a new autonomy stage goes through your change process before it reaches a unit.
  • Release is human. The conformance agent assembles the genealogy and checks it against spec; a person releases the lot.
  • Loss of Nitreum is loss of advice. The plant degrades to the way it runs today, not to a stop.

What leaves the plant, and when

Data flows
DataWhere it stays
Recipes, process settings, product and emissions modelsTenant-scoped; on-prem option
Feedstock, catalyst and supplier dataTenant-scoped
Audit log and lot genealogyThe plant's own storage, exportable
Rare-upset and drift patternsFederated, IP-isolated transfer across similar units (planned, opt-in)
Multi-agent handoff

Agents negotiate, they do not collide

Two agents will want the same actuator. The orchestrator arbitrates on the run goal, with process safety above everything, and the handoff is logged like any other step.

Contested move: ammonia-loop purge rate

  1. 01yield_takt.request(purge −8%) SUCCEEDED0.2 s

    Yield-and-Takt wants a lower purge rate on the ammonia loop so less hydrogen is lost and energy per tonne falls for the campaign.

  2. 02reform_synth.request(purge hold) SUCCEEDED0.2 s

    Reform-and-Synthesize requires the purge rate that keeps inerts inside the loop envelope the process-safety review approved. That envelope is not an optimization variable.

  3. 03orchestrator.arbitrate SUCCEEDED0.4 s

    Process safety outranks energy under every run goal. The envelope wins the actuator; the request for a lower purge is logged with its score and the reason it lost, and a smaller step is routed to a named approver.

  4. 04yield_takt.handoff(resequenced) SUCCEEDED95 s

    Yield-and-Takt recovers the energy target by shifting the dryer duty and the changeover window instead. Takt is met without touching the loop envelope.

Arbitration rules

  • Run goal first. Every request is scored against the declared goal, not against the requesting agent's local objective.
  • Process safety outranks everything. A safety-instrumented envelope or a permit limit is never an optimization variable. An ammonia-loop upset is a safety event; a takt miss is a schedule.
  • Time-boxed ownership. An agent holds a contested actuator for a bounded window, then must re-justify.
  • Everything is logged. The losing request, the score and the reason all appear in the run record.
  • Deadlocks escalate to a human rather than resolving by timeout.

See the agent roster

Enterprise

Standardize autonomy across the group

One policy model, one audit trail and one set of yield, energy, emissions and granule-quality benchmarks across every complex in the group, with each site's recipes, process settings and emissions models kept private to that site.

Talk to us Enterprise details

  • Multi-site plant-edge fleet with shared model governance
  • Custom product, process and emissions models per site
  • SSO and role-based access, named approvers (roadmap, 6 to 12 months)
  • Model versioning, validation reports and rollback
  • On-prem or private-cloud deployment
  • SLAs and outcome-based components on the highest-value workflows
FAQ

Straight answers

The questions complex operations managers, process engineers and HSE leads ask in the first meeting.

Only at the autonomy stage your plant has set, and only to an explicit allow-list of low-risk loops inside documented limits, through the approved DCS or APC interfaces. Every design partner starts in shadow mode, where Nitreum predicts and writes nothing. Assist mode follows, where a process engineer approves each recommendation. Bounded autonomy on granulation, conditioning and blending loops comes after the safety and ROI gates agreed up front.

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Get the security pack

The design posture, the data flows and the roadmap dates, written for an HSE lead, a process-safety engineer and an IT/OT lead.